The Communication Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case
for Renewing the Presumption Against Preemption
Ryan J.P. Dyer*
“The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a
lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Few things in history have expanded the reach of human enterprise
like the Internet. Since its inception, the Internet has disseminated the
most vital commodity known to man—information. But not all information is societally desirable. In fact, much of what the Internet serves to
disseminate is demonstrably criminal. Nevertheless, in the effort to unbind the “vibrant and competitive free market” of ideas on the Internet,
Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA).2 In essence, section 230 of the CDA grants immunity to “interactive computer service providers”3 (ICSPs) from liability for information
provided by a third party. 4 Courts have broadly applied section 230’s
grant of immunity to bar plaintiffs seeking to hold ICSPs liable for third*
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1. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 2008) (writing for the majority, Chief Judge Kozinski noted that “[t]he Internet is no longer
a fragile new means of communications that could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous
enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which commerce is conducted. And its
vast reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of
immunity provided by Congress and . . . comply with laws of general applicability.” Id. at n.15).
2. The Communications Decency Act, Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998) [hereinafter section 230] (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
3. For all intents and purposes—“websites.”
4. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996).
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party content posted to their websites.5 However, as the Internet permeates deeper into modern society, an increasing amount of criminal activity is finding refuge behind outdated and obtuse constructions of section
230’s immunity provisions.6 Consequently, state and local governments
are faced with a diminishing capacity to properly confront the widening
array of criminal activity perpetrated via the Internet. 7
Section 230 has garnered significant attention since its enactment,
and many commentators have noted the sweeping impunity it has bestowed upon websites that host third-party content.8 The initial scope of
immunity provided by courts applying section 230, as well as the practical consequences of its continued construction, is well documented.9 This
Comment strives to explain why courts applying section 230 today—
over fifteen years after its enactment and in the face of flagrantly criminal complicity on the part of websites—continue to accept the preemptive scope established by early courts. More specifically, this Comment
suggests that, in certain contexts, courts applying section 230 immunity
should reexamine the preemptive effect Congress intended section 230 to
have on traditional state police powers. 10 Doing so would not only reveal
the unwarranted scope of activities currently deemed immune under section 230, but would also redeem the ability of state and local authorities
to combat the increasing amount of criminal activity on the Internet. 11
Part II of this Comment outlines the legislative history and intent of
section 230, as well as the evolution of judicial construction and application of the statute’s immunity-granting provision. Part III discusses how
early courts’ over-expansive interpretation of section 230, coupled with
the current proliferation of cybercrime, is increasingly paralyzing states’
efforts to combat crime perpetrated via the Internet. Part IV identifies the
locus of continued misconstruction by courts applying section 230 as the
failure to reevaluate Congress’s preemptive intent in light of the changing dynamic on the Internet. Part V analyzes the several judicial and legislative solutions that could alleviate the strain that section 230 immunity

5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.B–C.
8. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 373, 410–12 (2010).
9. See infra Part II–III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part IV. See generally INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, 2012 INTERNET CRIME REPORT (2013), available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/ann
ualreport/2012 _IC3Report.pdf.
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puts on state and local efforts to deal with criminal activity perpetrated
via the Internet. Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE CONCEPTION & APPLICATION OF SECTION 230
Section 230’s inclusion as part of the CDA represented Congress’s
desire to remove the disincentives for online intermediaries to police activity on their websites. The new provision arrived with a splash as early
courts gave section 230’s scope of immunity expansive effect.12 Originally, the provision was intended to encourage the removal of offensive
content; instead, it has developed into a broad grant of immunity for
websites that host offensive and criminal content.
A. A Brief History
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 was enacted at the
height of a national struggle between explosive growth in the telecommunications industry 13 and resurgent social conservatism. 14 Senator
James Exon from Nebraska spearheaded the legislation, intending to
combat the danger posed to the youth of America15 by “barbarian pornographers.”16 Several CDA provisions were widely scrutinized for their
questionable constitutionality. 17 Eventually, in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down portions of the Act that criminalized the transmission of indecent material accessible to minors. 18 Yet most of the Act
still remained intact, including section 230.
Section 230, titled “Protection for Private Blocking and Screening
of Offensive Material,” was created “to promote the continued development of the Internet.” 19 At the time of the CDA’s creation, Congress

12. See infra Part II.B.
13. WALTER SAPRONOV & WILLIAM H. READ, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: LAW, REGULATION,
AND POLICY xi (1998).
14. For additional background on the social conservative movement in the mid-1990s, see
DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE
POLITICAL HISTORY (2007).
15. For an extensive discussion regarding the legislative history of the CDA, see Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996).
16. 141 CONG. REC. S8339 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Senator Exon) (quoting
Brock N. Meeks).
17. See Cannon, supra note 15, at 65–72 (discussing the popular opposition to introduction of
the CDA amongst member of the Senate and House of Representatives).
18. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (invalidating provisions of section 223(a) and (d)
except as applied to child pornography).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (1996).
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doubted certain CDA provisions would survive constitutional scrutiny20
and thus enacted section 230 as a “complementary backstop” to the Act’s
more dubious provisions. 21 Congress was also motivated to override a
recent decision of a New York trial court in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services.22
In Stratton Oakmont, an ICSP was held liable for a third party’s libelous statements posted on its computer bulletin boards. 23 The ICSP
exercised some editorial control over the content posted on its interactive
user bulletin boards and touted itself as a family-oriented computer network.24 The court held that because the ICSP had exercised some editorial control over its bulletin boards, it could be held liable under a publisher theory of liability just like a brick-and-mortar newspaper or magazine.25
Concerned that the decision in Stratton Oakmont would serve as a
disincentive for ICSPs to exercise any editorial control over third-party
content posted to their sites lest they incur full publisher liability, Congress responded by including section 230 in the CDA. 26 Specifically,
Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden proposed an amendment to the draft CDA (the Cox–Wyden Proposal).27 The Cox–Wyden
Proposal sought to address the dilemma Stratton Oakmont created by
removing traditional forms of publisher liability for ICSPs who acted in
good faith to restrict access to offensive content.28 However, unlike the
provisions Senator Exon advocated,29 the Cox–Wyden Proposal did not
affirmatively require ICSPs to make good faith efforts to qualify for im-

20. See 141 CONG. REC. S8331 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
21. See David Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The
Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 375 (2010).
22. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *3–4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995).
23. Id. at *17–18.
24. Id. at *2.
25. Id. at *10–11.
26. The congressional approval of such action can be seen in 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10 (“One of the specific
purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own
because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”).
27. 141 CONG. REC. 22044–45 (amendment offered by Rep. Cox).
28. Id.
29. See sources cited supra note 16 and accompanying text.

2014]

Communication Decency Act Gone Wild

841

munity.30 Nevertheless, both the Exon and Cox–Wyden Proposals were
enacted as part of the CDA.
The immunity-granting provision of section 230 provides as follows:
(c) Protection for “good samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.31

Section 230 expansively defines an “interactive computer service” to
include all online service providers and websites;32 an “information content provider” is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service.”33 Congress attempted
to limit the scope of immunity by stating that section 230 would have no
effect on federal criminal statutes, intellectual property law, communications privacy law, or “any State law that is consistent with this section.”34
However, subsection (c) has unintentionally become the most impactful
language within the entire CDA, controlling virtually every cause of action against ICSPs.35
B. Judicial Treatment
Generally, courts broadly interpret section 230 and the immunity it
provides ICSPs. As discussed below, early courts benefited from factual
30. Id. In this way, the Cox–Wyden Proposal differed from the provisions Senator Exon advocated, which required good faith efforts in to qualify for immunity and were subsequently struck
down by the court in Reno v. ACLU. 47 U.S.C. § 223(f)(1) (1996).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
32. Specifically, an “interactive computer service” is “any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educations institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)
(1996). Courts have construed interactive computer service broadly to include websites. Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1996).
34. Id. § 230(e)(3).
35. For an extensive compilation of cases and their outcomes involving the widespread usage
of section 230, see Ken S. Myers, Wikimunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163 (2006); see also Claudia G Catalano, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Applications of Immunity Provisions of Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. §
230, 52 A.L.R. FED.2d 37 (2011).
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circumstances mirroring the context in which section 230(c) was meant
to apply. However, the first courts to interpret and apply section 230
went “further than was necessary to effectuate the congressional goals”
of the statute’s immunity-granting provision. 36 Although unapparent at
first, this over-expansive reading of section 230(c) laid the groundwork
for broad applications of immunity by future courts in contexts blatantly
incommensurate with the statutes intended scope and effect.
The first major case interpreting section 230 was the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.37 Plaintiff Zeran was the
subject of a hoax in which an unidentified person advertised t-shirts displaying offensive slogans related to the recent Oklahoma City bombing. 38 The posted advertisement appeared on America Online’s (AOL)
public message boards and listed Zeran’s phone number, urging viewers
to contact Zeran for more information. 39 Zeran was quickly inundated
with threatening phone calls from viewers of the ad, and the next day he
called AOL to complain. 40 AOL agreed to remove the ad but did not issue a retraction, and shortly after, similar ads continued to appear. 41 Zeran filed suit claiming that once AOL received notice of the fallacious
postings, it had a duty to remove the postings, issue a retraction, and prevent a reoccurrence.42
In an attempt to give far-reaching effect to Congress’s intent to
overrule Stratton Oakmont, the Fourth Circuit broadly interpreted section
230’s scope of immunity afforded ICSPs.43 Specifically, the court interpreted the section 230(c) safe harbor provisions to confer immunity to
ICSPs for a broad range of claims including “tort-based lawsuits” and
“tort liability.” 44 The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation represented a farreaching application of section 230(c), which previously had been
thought to target mainly defamation-based claims. 45 Furthermore, the
36. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 385.
37. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
38. Id. at 329.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 330.
43. Id. at 328.
44. Id. at 330.
45. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 395–99 (2010). Lukmire contends:
Properly read, Zeran, at its most expansive, ought to have stood for the proposition that
section 230 conferred immunity on Internet entities only insofar as third-party content
caused ‘defamation-type’ harms. The court’s reliance on doctrine exclusive to defamation
law to establish that ‘distributor liability is a subset of publisher liability’ contradicts the
notion that sections 230’s safe harbor extends to any legal malfeasance perpetrated by
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court repeatedly stated that free speech concerns had been a major factor
motivating Congress to enact the section 230(c) safe harbor provisions46—a proposition not necessarily supported by the provision’s text
or history. 47 Nevertheless, Zeran established the precedent for broad
grants of immunity under section 230(c), a standard currently followed
by a majority of both federal and state courts.48
For more than a decade, the broad immunity afforded by the holding in Zeran stood as an insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs seeking to
impose liability on ICSPs. For example, in Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth
Circuit faced the issue of whether an operator of an Internet site maintaining an electronic newsletter was liable for selecting and publishing an
allegedly defamatory e-mail.49 The court instructed that “the exclusion of
‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material and to
edit the material published while retaining its basic form and message.”50
While a publisher could encounter liability for substantial alterations, the
Batzel court’s holding turned on the fact that the operator made no material contribution to the e-mail at issue during the editing process and
therefore was not responsible for the e-mail’s defamatory content.51
Similarly, in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., a Texas district court declined
to hold MySpace liable for failing to implement safety measures to protect minors from online sexual predators. 52 The plaintiff attempted to rely
on state common law tort principles and alleged liability on the theory
that because MySpace “knew sexual predators were using the service to
communicate with minors . . . it was foreseeable that minors such as Julie
a third party.
Id. at 395–96 (citations omitted).
46. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31, 333–35.
47. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 385, 389.
48. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 (Cal. 2006) (describing Zeran as the
leading case interpreting section 230 immunity); see also id. at 518 n.9 (listing state and federal
cases following Zeran’s interpretation of section 230 immunity). Specifically, courts have relied on
Zeran to establish three elements required for section 230 immunity: “(1) the defendant must be a
provider or user of an ‘interactive computer service’; (2) the asserted claims must treat the defendant
as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the challenged communication must be ‘information provided by another information content provider.’” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037
(9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
49. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tex. 2007). The plaintiff, a
thirteen-year-old girl, had misrepresented her age when creating an online profile on MySpace’s
social networking site and was subsequently contacted by an adult man who allegedly perpetrated a
sexual assault on her. Id. at 846.
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Doe could be injured by the criminal acts of adult MySpace users.”53 The
court disagreed and, relying heavily on Zeran, held that MySpace was
merely an intermediary “provid[ing] its services to users for free” and
thus fell squarely within the safe harbor provisions of section 230(c). 54
In contrast, the first case seriously limiting the application of section 230 immunity was the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC
(Roommates).55 The Housing Council sued Roommates.com for matching individuals based on their answers to mandatory online questions
concerning criteria banned by the federal Fair Housing Act 56 and California housing discrimination laws. 57 Despite Roommates.com’s undisputed status as an “interactive service provider” within the meaning of
section 230, the plaintiff alleged the site was more than a mere publisher
of information provided by its users. 58 Instead, Roommates.com was acting as an “information content provider” because the site created, posted,
required completion of, and disseminated the results of unlawful questionnaires. 59 In a divided opinion, 60 the court agreed that Roommates.com’s activities were sufficient to make it “‘responsible . . . in part’
for creating or developing” content, and thus, Roommates.com failed to
fulfill the third element of section 230(c) and was not entitled to immunity.61
The Roommates decision received mixed reviews from legal scholars and Internet-industry observers. 62 Many commentators felt that the
Roommates court had created a “slippery slope” by assigning such an
extensive definition to the term “development.” 63 Others regarded the
move as a necessary limitation to the provisions of section 230, which
53. Id. at 851.
54. Id. at 850.
55. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008).
56. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955
(2012).
57. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162.
58. Id. at 1164–65.
59. Id.
60. The court split 8–3 with Chief Judge Kozinski writing for the majority and Judge McKeown concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 1160, 1176.
61. Id. at 1165–69. The third element requires that the challenged communication must be
“information provided by another information content provider” and not by the ICSP itself. Id. at
1162 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1996)).
62. See Eric Weslander, Murky “Development”: How the Ninth Circuit Exposed Ambiguity
Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 267, 290–94 (2008).
63. Id. at 293–95.
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had fostered an unchecked environment of “internet exceptionalism.”64
What was clear was that the holding in Roommates opened the door to
new theories of exclusions to section 230 immunity. 65
A particular piece of language from the Roommates decision provided the basis for arguably the narrowest application of section 230’s
safe harbor provisions. In defining the term “develop,” the Roommates
court noted that “a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus
falls within the exceptions to section 230, if it contributes materially to
the alleged illegality of the conduct.” 66 A discrepancy immediately
emerged regarding the application of the “underlying illegality” test: is
express “solicitation” on the part of the ICSP required, or is mere “inducement” sufficient to trigger liability?67 To date, most cases have required that the defendant explicitly solicit illegal content.68 However, in
NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc. (StubHub),69 a Massachusetts trial court expansively applied Roommates’s articulation of develop and denied immunity to an ICSP for merely inducing the creation of illegal content.70
The inducement standard articulated in StubHub apparently does not require an actual request and can occur even when third parties retain unfettered discretion over the content. 71 Although the exact contours of the
theory are unclear, liability under an inducement standard is based on an
indistinct determination that the defendant’s actions influenced a third
party’s decision to post illegal content.72
64. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 398–99; but see Varty Defterderian, Fair Housing Council v.
Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 564 (2009).
65. See Weslander, supra note 62, at 293–97; Jeffrey R. Doty, Inducement or Solicitation?
Competing Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the Wake of Roommates.com, 6
WASH J. L. TECH. & ARTS 125, 129–32 (2010).
66. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168 (emphasis added).
67. For an extensive discussion of the “underlying illegality” test, see Doty, supra note 65, at
126; see also Zac Locke, Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites That Distribute
Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151 (2008).
68. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); Best
Western Int’l, Inc. v. Furber, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 4182827 (D. Ariz. 2008);
Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
69. NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26,
2009). In NPS v. StubHub, the New England Patriots brought suit against StubHub alleging tortious
interference by allowing season ticket holders to unlawfully sell their tickets. Id. at *4. StubHub
operated a website that allowed users to buy and sell tickets to sporting, concert, theater, and other
live entertainment events. Id. at *2. StubHub did not buy or sell the tickets directly but it did profit
from the transactions and facilitated these ticket sales in a number of ways. StubHub even allowed
sellers to “mask” the ticket location by listing a seat up to five rows away, making it impossible for
the Patriots to determine which ticket holders were selling their tickets. Id. at *3.
70. See id.
71. Id. at *12–13.
72. Id.
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The first courts to apply section 230 inferred an exaggerated statutory meaning and intent to the statute’s immunity-granting provision,
rarely reexamining the basis of those findings. Several early courts have
crafted various frameworks to exempt section 230 immunity; however,
they have done so through a more limited analytical framework, focusing
on section 230’s mechanics and definitions. 73 Courts have yet to delve
deeper into an analysis of the preemptive intent Congress envisioned for
section 230. This is especially troubling given the increasing frequency
that section 230 immunity is invoked in non-defamation contexts and the
preemptive effect that necessarily follows other state civil and criminal
laws.
III. SECTION 230’S INCREASING IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
The ever-increasing migration of human activity to computer technology, specifically the Internet, has encapsulated nearly every aspect of
society. Unsurprisingly, this shift includes an increasing amount of criminal activity, which has been transformed into a new and more diffuse
form—cybercrime.74 Traditional modes of law enforcement are not well
adapted to combat cybercrime because it differs from traditional crime in
several fundamental ways. Nevertheless, section 230’s over-application
into non-publisher forms of liability—such as distributor liability—has
quickly invaded numerous forms of state civil and criminal liability that
would normally serve as effective tools for combating cybercrime. The
effect is an utter preemption of state laws as applied to ICSPs engaged in
criminal activity, rendering states helpless to enforce their historic police
powers to combat the proliferation of cybercrime.
A. The Proliferation of Cybercrime
Cybercrime essentially encompasses three distinct categories. In the
first category, the actual computer and associated information technology
is the target of the offense; the perpetrator often employs hacking, virus
dissemination, or the interruption of computer services. 75 The second
category entails a traditional crime where the computer and Internet

73. See generally Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); StubHub, 2009 WL 995483; Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
74. “Cybercrime” essentially denotes the use of computer technology to achieve an unlawful
purpose. See generally Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As “Virtual Crime”?, 4 CAL. CRIM.
L. REV. 1 (2001).
75. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 465, 468–69 (1997).
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merely play an incidental role; for example, a ransom note sent by kidnappers via e-mail.76 The third and final category also consists of traditional crimes, but the computer and Internet play an instrumental role in
carrying out the offense. 77 Common examples of this category include
identity theft, fraud, fencing stolen property, and commercial sex advertising.78 Traditional modes of law enforcement cannot effectively combat
most forms of cybercrime because of the inherent differences between
cybercrime and the traditional crimes law enforcement have evolved to
combat.79 Specifically, cybercrime differs from traditional crime because
it is physically diffuse and frequently occurs on a much broader scale. 80
Given the inherent challenges of combatting cybercrime, it is simply unfeasible for law enforcement to address every instance. 81 One viable
alternative is for law enforcement to focus on the various technological
intermediaries necessary to conduct Internet activity in general. 82 Such
intermediaries generally fall into three categories.83
The first category includes intermediaries that provide the network
and infrastructure to facilitate the physical transportation of data across
the Internet.84 Intermediaries in this category typically operate solely as
passive conduits transmitting the data between users and other intermediaries.85 Common examples of this first category include cable Internet
providers, satellite providers, or wireless carriers. 86

76. See generally id.
77. See generally Brenner, supra note 74.
78. Id.
79. See Susan Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of Law Enforcement?, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 25 (2004). Professor Brenner identifies four
primary components of cybercrime that differ inherently from most traditional criminal activity.
First, cybercrime does not require “any degree of physical proximity between victim and victimizer
at the moment the ‘crime’ is committed.” Id. at 25 (footnote omitted). Second, cybercrime is not
confined to a definite scale because the internet “acts as a force multiplier that vastly increases the
number of ‘crimes’ an individual can commit.” Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). Third, “perpetrators of
cybercrime are not restricted by the [physical] constraints that” otherwise govern perpetrators of
traditional crimes. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted). Finally, the novel nature of cybercrime means that
law enforcement “cannot identify patterns comparable to those that exist for real-world crime.” Id. at
33 (footnote omitted).
80. For an extended discussion of the distinctions between cybercrime and traditional crime,
see Brenner, supra note 74, at 25–40.
81. Id.
82. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1585 (2005).
83. See Ardia, supra note 8, at 386.
84. See Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. R EV. 653, 664 (2003).
85. See Ardia, supra note 8, at 386–87.
86. See generally Zittrain, supra note 84.
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The second category of intermediary is comprised of content hosts
that store, cache, or otherwise provide users with access to third party
generated content. 87 Essentially, these conduit intermediaries either host
the servers that store online content created by third parties or create the
websites that allow users to access content, often assuming both functions.88 Common examples include websites such as Yahoo, Facebook,
and GoDaddy. The third and final category of intermediaries includes
search engines and application service providers, which essentially provide tools for finding, indexing, filtering, and formatting content. 89
Common examples include Google, Bing, and various spam-filtering
software.
The first and third types of intermediaries—those that serve as passive conduits and provide neutral search tools—are generally only passively monitored by law enforcement. 90 This is because both types of
intermediaries typically only serve as passive mediums, which criminals
misappropriate to unlawful ends, even though the vast majority of activity is perfectly legal. 91 Alternatively, the second form of intermediary—
comprised of content hosts—can directly and affirmatively enhance the
unlawful activities’ effects.92 This is most often true in situations where
the website is largely devoted to hosting or providing a forum for the
unlawful conduct in question. For example, a gossip website that encourages posting of frivolous information and rumors on its message boards
materially contributes to any defamatory postings that result.93 Or a ticket
resale website that facilitates the resale of pre-purchased tickets materially enhances the violation of state anti-scalping laws. 94 Or even a classifieds website that hosts large quantities of commercial sex advertisements materially facilitates prostitution, human trafficking, and child
exploitation.95

87. See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933,
936–37 (2008).
88. See generally Ardia, supra note 8.
89. Id. at 389.
90. See Brenner, supra note 74, at 55–65 (discussing the need for law enforcement to work
cooperatively with the public to monitor websites for criminal activity).
91. Id.
92. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 82.
93. See Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010
(E.D. Ky. 2012).
94. See NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483, at *10 (Mass. Dist.
Ct. Jan. 26, 2009).
95. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2009); M.A. ex rel. P.K. v.
Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043–46 (E.D. Mo. 2011).
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Traditionally, brick-and-mortar establishments96 incur criminal liability for knowingly facilitating criminal activity.97 For example, knowingly hosting or profiting from explicit criminal activity is commonly
chargeable under an accessory theory attached to the underlying crime. 98
Even if a physical establishment could flout criminal liability by avoiding knowledge of the criminal activity, it would nevertheless incur civil
liability from both public and private actors for negligently contributing
to the illegal activities. 99 In this way, criminal and civil liability could
potentially serve as a disincentive for physical establishments that otherwise might have facilitated criminal activity. However, as more physical
establishments move their activities to the Internet, they leave behind
much of the liability previously assumed under the brick-and-mortar
model. And with that transition, law enforcement’s ability to enforce
criminal statutes is steadily eroding.
B. Section 230’s Assimilation of Distributor Liability
From the outset, section 230 “upended a set of principles enshrined
in common law doctrines that had been developed over decades, if not
centuries, in cases involving offline intermediaries.” 100 Section 230’s
enactment abruptly extinguished forms of civil liability for intermediaries that hosted and disseminated tortious content—that much is obvious. 101 More insidious, however, is how section 230 obviates various
models of criminal liability. 102 Numerous criminal theories of liability
that traditionally held intermediaries accountable for contributing to unlawful activity are increasingly subsumed into the general immunities
conferred by section 230.103 This dynamic is exacerbated with the in-

96. By brick-and-mortar establishments, this Comment refers to the physical equivalent of an
entity that can now operate entirely online. For example, a traditional newspaper such as the New
York Times is a brick-and-mortar publisher and is subject to the full battery of legal liability for the
content they publish and distribute to the public.
97. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2011) (describing the criminal liability incurred by persons or entities that facilitate criminal activity).
98. Id.
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977) (describing the liability incurred
by distributors who continue to exhibit unlawful material).
100. Ardia, supra note 8, at 411.
101. Id.
102. See generally Lawrence G. Walters, Shooting the Messenger: An Analysis of Theories of
Criminal Liability Used Against Adult-Themed Online Service Providers, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
171 (2012).
103. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 395–99.
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creased migration of criminal activity to online intermediaries dedicated
to hosting unlawful content.104
The most obvious civil liability that section 230 removed—indeed
the most intended in the CDA’s enactment—is tortious theories of publisher liability. 105 In fact, the legislative history of section 230 clearly
indicates Congress’s intent to immunize ICSPs engaged in good faith
publishing efforts as well as those who serve merely as passive conduits
of third-party created content.106 However, given early courts’ sweeping
application of section 230’s open-ended language, the courts also subsumed another form of civil liability into the section’s immunity granting
provision: distributor liability.107
Distributor liability pertains to entities that host and disseminate
content to the public. Specifically, an entity that distributes content can
be held liable if it knows or has reason to know of the content’s tortious
or illegal nature. 108 Once a distributor knows or has reason to know that
the content it is disseminating is unlawful, it must either cease providing
the material or incur liability. 109 In the intermediary context, the second
form of intermediary (those that host and disseminate online content)
would normally be subject to traditional distributor liability. 110 This differs from the first and third category of intermediaries (physical infrastructure providers and passive conduits), which take no affirmative actions to distribute content.111
Similar to the subtle distinctions between the three types of online
intermediaries,112 the distinctions for content hosts between publication
and distribution liability is sometimes ambiguous. Section 230 was clearly intended to remove the disincentive for online intermediaries to engage in any publishing functions with respect to the content they host.113
Thus, an online intermediary can engage in good faith efforts “to restrict
access to or availability of” offensive material without incurring the
104. See supra Part III.B.
105. This proposition is demonstrated by the very text of section 230(c)(1), which states, “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information provided by another information content provider.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996) (emphasis added).
106. See supra Part II.A.
107. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 402–05.
108. See Ardia, supra note 8, at 397–98.
109. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977) (describing the liability
incurred by distributors who continue to exhibit unlawful material).
110. See supra Part III.B.
111. See supra Part III.B.
112. See supra Part III.B.
113. See source cited supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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normal liabilities associated with publishing content. 114 There is no indication, however, that section 230 was intended to immunize distributive
activities by online intermediaries.115 Distribution differs from publishing
in that, while publishing is focused on the editorializing of the contents
substance, distribution is concerned with optimizing the dissemination of
the content to viewers. 116 On its face, section 230’s entire focus is on
immunizing good faith publishing functions. 117 Nevertheless, courts’
overly broad application of section 230(c) consistently ignores the inherent distinction between publishing and distribution and instead applies
blanket immunity to a broad range of claims.118
Judicial misapplications of section 230 immunity to ICSPs engaged
in the distribution of tortious content have obviated the entire field of
distributor liability. 119 Some commentators view this as an acceptable
consequence “in facilitating the development of . . . modified exceptionalism encourag[ing] ‘collaborative production’ and the emergence of
‘non-commodified digital space that facilitates communication.’” 120 In
other words, the “exceptional” benefits the Internet provides justify a
largely hands-off regulatory approach. 121 And perhaps that reasoning is
correct, especially given the effect the CDA has in enabling the proliferation of communication.122 However, the collateral consequence of subsuming distributor liability into section 230 immunity is beginning to
yield unacceptable consequences, particularly with regard to various
criminal theories of liability that share the same elemental principles of
culpability as distributive liability.
C. Section 230’s Preemption of State’s Traditional Police Powers
The courts’ extension of section 230’s immunity granting provision
to distribution theories of civil liability inherently implicates complicity
114. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(A) (1996).
115. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 381–86; David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet,
61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 162 (1997) (“[O]ne could argue from the enumeration of publisher and speaker
liability in § 230(c)(1) that distributor liability was deliberately omitted.”).
116. See Sheridan, supra note 115, at 161–63.
117. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
118. Lukmire, supra note 21, at 395.
119. See id. at 402–05.
120. H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities
of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 391 (2008) (asserting that section 230 embodies a form of “CyberLibertarian Exceptionalism”).
121. Id.; see also Walters, supra note 102, at 212 (claiming that online intermediaries are, “at
most, passive conduits of information”).
122. See Holland, supra note 120, at 386–88.
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theories of criminal liability. “Complicity” represents a foundational element of criminal liability that shares the basic theories of culpability as
distributor liability in the civil context.123 Specifically, complicity theories are supported by the concept that having actual or constructive
knowledge of illegal conduct confers criminal liability on actions taken
that enable or further the criminal activity. 124 For example, it is a crime
in many states to knowingly engage in conduct that aids or facilitates
prostitution,125 and normally an enterprise that actively facilitates commercial sex advertising could be subject to criminal liability. 126 However,
if such an enterprise moves its activities online, in the form of an intermediary content provider, it flouts normal criminal liability under section
230. This is because the immunity granting provision contained in section 230(c) is wrongly interpreted by courts to preempt state laws that
seek to hold the ICSPs liable for the elicit content and activity they
knowingly host.
Section 230 preempts “any State or local law that” seeks to impose
liability inconsistent with the immunity section 230 affords. 127 Courts
applying this preemptive provision largely accept the Zeran court’s interpretation that section 230 broadly immunizes websites from forms of
“tort-based lawsuits” and “tort liability.”128 This combination opens the
doors for an application of section 230 immunity to various forms of
state and local complicity theories of criminal liability thereby preempting the entire field of otherwise applicable law. And given the increasing
amount of traditional crimes being facilitated via online intermediaries, 129 broad application of section 230 immunity is progressively obstructing historic police powers.
States are frustrated. Tired of capitulating the invulnerability of certain forms of criminal activity that had migrated to the Internet, some
states have attempted to expand criminal liability to online intermediaries
facilitating criminal activity on the Internet. For example, in Washington
State, legislators passed a bill that criminalized the act of hosting com-

123. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2011), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
577(2) (1977).
124. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1004 (2012).
125. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.060 (2011).
126. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (2011).
127. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (1996).
128. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Lukmire, supra
note 21, at 395.
129. See supra Part III.A.
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mercial sex advertisements involving a minor.130 The provisions of the
bill essentially imposed strict liability on ICSPs that hosted commercial
sex advertisements depicting minors, which could only be overcome by a
showing of “bona fide” efforts to ascertain the age of the individual depicted.131 Another state followed suit by introducing similar legislation
designed to expressly criminalize websites that actively advertised commercial sex. 132 The Washington law was quickly challenged by ICSPs
claiming it was preempted by section 230133 and that it violated the First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 134 A federal district court agreed
and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the law’s enforcement in
July 2012.135 According to the court decision, Washington’s unsuccessful
attempt to impose criminal liability on websites advertising minors for
commercial sex was clearly incongruent with section 230.136 However,
the bill does represent a growing frustration—if not desperation—by

130. Senate Bill 6251 was scheduled to take effect on June 7, 2012, and essentially extended
criminal liability to websites which hosted commercial sexual advertisements depicting a minor. The
relevant provisions of the bill are as follows:
(1) A person commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor if he
or she knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays, or causes directly or indirectly, to
be published, disseminated or displayed, and advertisement for a commercial sex act,
which is to take place in the state of Washington and that includes the depiction of a minor . . . .
(2) In a prosecution under this statute, it is not a defense that the defendant did not know
the age of the minor depicted in the advertisement. It is a defense, which the defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor depicted in the advertisement by requiring, prior to publication, dissemination, or display of the advertisement, production of
a driver’s license, marriage license, birth certificate, or other governmental or educational
identification card or paper of the minor depicted in the advertisement.
S.B. 6251, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
131. Id.
132. Specifically, the Tennessee legislature passed a similar law to the Washington bill. See
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-315 (2012). However, the Tennessee law was soon challenged in federal
court and subsequently enjoined from enforcement. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, No. 3:12-cv-00654, 2013 WL 1249063, at *2
(M.D. Tenn. 2013).
133. See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction, Backpage.com, LLC v.
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
134. Id. at 1275–86. In many respects, the bill was just like the older provisions of the CDA
that were struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU.
135. Id. at 1265.
136. As the court in Backpage.com stated,
SB 6251 is inconsistent with Section 230 because it criminalizes the ‘knowing’ publication, dissemination, or display of specified content. In doing so, it creates an incentive for
online service providers not to monitor the content that passes through its channels. This
was precisely the situation that the CDA was enacted to remedy.
Id. at 1273 (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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state and local governments to combat the increasing amount of criminal
activity finding safe refuge on the Internet.
As more and more criminal activity migrates to the Internet and
with the apparent difficulty for states to criminalize complicity by intermediaries, section 230’s preemptive effect on traditional state laws is
mounting. These civil and criminal laws stand at the heart of state’s historic police powers. Surely this was not Congress’s intent when it enacted section 230. Nonetheless, if this trend continues, the states’ ability to
combat criminal activity will continue to erode, and with it, a fundamental component of their sovereignty.
IV. RENEWING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
Modern courts applying section 230 immunity frequently accept the
broad preemptive effect given to the statute by earlier courts. Missing
from virtually every court’s analysis is a presumption against section
230’s preemption of traditional state police powers in non-publisher contexts. Were courts to reexamine Congress’s preemptive intent, it would
quickly become apparent that section 230 was only intended to override
publisher theories of liability. As illustrated below, this is evident from
both the text of section 230 as well as the legislative history and purpose.
While Congress generally has broad authority to regulate the Internet, it does not necessarily follow that courts should give section 230 the
broadest possible effect. The Internet simultaneously embodies a channel, 137 article, 138 instrumentality, 139 and activity substantially affecting
interstate commerce. 140 Accordingly, Congress generally has broad authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the Internet, and any such
regulation will preempt “state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to,
federal law.”141 But the mere ability of Congress to regulate the Internet
does not necessarily preempt concurring state regulation.142 Even if Congress acts, courts should maintain a presumption against preemption ab137. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 357 (1964).
138. See, e.g., E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
140. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
141. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
142. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (arguing that the states retain “flexibility to regulate Internet” despite
its obvious categorization as interstate commerce). Professors Goldsmith and Sykes argue against
the categorical presumptions by earlier commentators that any local regulation of the Internet represented a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1123–34 (1996).
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sent a showing of Congress’s “clear and manifest” intent to invalidate
local regulation. 143 A court’s “ultimate task” in determining whether a
federal law preempts a local regulation is to decide whether the local law
is consistent with the “structure and purpose” of the federal statute.144 In
application, a court’s conflict inquiry is “guided by two cornerstones
of . . . pre-emption jurisprudence.”145 First, “the purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” 146 Second, courts
assume “that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”147
In determining the first cornerstone—Congress’s preemptive intent—courts will look for either an express preemption provision within
the statute or a clear conflict in which state law frustrates the federal
statutory purposes or objectives. 148 Turning back to section 230, Congress expressly articulated the preemptive scope of the statue as it pertains to state law: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”149 Unfortunately, this language is entirely self-referencing and essentially directs
courts to engage in the second cornerstone analysis identified above:
identifying impliedly preempted statutes.150
A plain language reading of section 230 and its legislative history
implies that Congress only intended to preempt State laws that imposed
publisher liability. Identifying the purpose of Congress necessitates a
broader inquiry into Congress’s general intent by enacting the statute.151

143. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
144. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); see also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824) (“[T]hough enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers,
[laws that] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . must yield to [federal law].”).
145. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
146. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
147. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Intrinsically, the presumption against preemption of state’s traditional police powers resonates of
this country’s thematic notion of federalism and inherent state sovereignty and, therefore, should be
maintained in every instance. See Robert S. Peck, A Separation-of-Powers Defense of the “Presumption Against Preemption,” 84 TUL L. REV. 1185, 1196 (2010).
148. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–68 (1941); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary
Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV.
253, 270–72 (2011).
149. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (1996).
150. See Young, supra note 148, at 273–76.
151. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 556 (2009).
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Thankfully, this inquiry is short, since Congress expressly articulated the
policies underlying section 230:
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals,
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive
computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate
material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassing
by means of computer.152

Essentially, Congress’s purposes for enacting section 230 can be loosely
categorized into three separate policy goals. First, Congress wanted to
keep the Internet largely deregulated and allow the current online economy to continue to grow unhindered.153 Next, Congress intended to overturn the Stratton Oakmont ruling and remove the disincentive for websites to exercise any efforts at removing offensive content from their
site.154 Finally, Congress intended to ensure decency on the Internet.155
Considering the three distinct policy aims of Congress, section 230
does not preempt the entire field of online regulation leaving nothing for
states.156 Specifically, Congress’s purpose was to preempt state and local
laws that imposed civil liability for websites that took voluntary efforts
to remove offensive material provided by third parties—by focusing on
152. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(5) (1996).
153. See supra Part II.A–B. (discussing the Cox–Wyden proposal’s aim in the overall statutory
framework of Senator Exon’s CDA).
154. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
155. See generally Cannon, supra note 15.
156. Any state is free to enforce state laws so long as such laws are “consistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (1996).
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publisher liability. 157 This purpose was “clear and manifest” given the
express policy aims contained in section 230(b), the explicit strictures of
immunity formulated in 230(c), and the circumstantial context of Congress’s response. 158
Initially, courts only struck down the laws that Congress intended
to preempt. Because the early courts applying section 230 were largely
dealing with factual circumstances similar to those originally envisioned
by section 230’s drafters, their preemption analysis of conflicting state
and local laws was fairly straightforward. 159 As preemption analysis of
traditional publisher liability laws was the express aim of section 230,160
courts generally accepted the preemptive effect when analyzing inconsistent state laws.161
Unfortunately, as the Internet continued to grow, section 230 was
invoked in more and more circumstances outside of those initially envisioned by the drafters. For example, the district court in Roommates erroneously applied section 230’s publisher immunity to the defendant
ICSP for conduct that amounted to content creation and dissemination.162
And in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court
ruling that the CDA precluded a promissory estoppel claim after the defendant-website promised to remove a fake profile of the plaintiff but
then failed to do so.163 Specifically, the Barnes court determined that the
district court was correct in applying section 230 immunity to the plaintiff’s claims that the website had a duty to remove the offensive content;
however, the CDA did not cover promissory estoppel arising from the
website’s voluntary commitment to remove the posting. 164
The cases outlined above demonstrate how courts often accept the
broad preemptive effect that early courts assigned to section 230(c) and
infrequently examine the individual claims involved. That is, courts sel-

157. Id.; see Sheridan, supra note 115, at 151–52.
158. Congress was specifically responding to the Stratton Oakmont ruling in an effort to avoid
similar circumstances in the future. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
159. Specifically, early courts applied section 230 immunity in instances where a website was
being sued by a private individual seeking to impose a form of publisher liability on the website for
hosting or providing a means of distribution of defamatory or otherwise offensive content. See, e.g.,
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997); Carafano v. Metrosplash, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983
(10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998).
160. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
161. See supra note 48 and accompanying cases.
162. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
164. Id.
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dom engage in a refreshed inquiry into whether or not the facts and circumstances of a case are consistent with the limited scope and preemptive context in which Congress intended section 230 to operate. Instead,
courts accept broad articulations of section 230’s preemptive effect with
little thought to the impact of the changing circumstances on the Internet.
What is actually warranted in cases alleging non-publisher theories of
liability is a renewed inquiry into Congress’s preemptive intent, replete
with a presumption against preemption.
Also missing from current courts’ application of section 230 is the
presumption against preemption of traditional state police powers. The
obvious effect is that increasingly more criminal activity finds a safe haven on websites dedicated to facilitating unlawful activity. This is largely
avoidable because a renewed inquiry into the preemptive effect of section 230 would reveal that Congress did not intend to immunize websites
engaged in blatantly criminal activity. Criminal activity does not serve
any of the three general policy goals stated in the statute: Specifically, an
ICSP that hosts a significant amount of cybercrime does not help drive
the growth of the online economy (at least not the legal online economy).
Those ICSPs do not engage in good faith efforts to remove objectionable
content from the Internet,165 but are instead in the business of hosting and
disseminating objectionable content. And they most certainly do not
comport with the overarching statutory framework of the CDA. 166 As
such, courts should stop presuming preemption in all section 230 cases,
and instead examine the text of section 230 and Congress’s intent to
preempt state laws.
V. SOLUTIONS
Even if courts engage in a renewed analysis of section 230’s
preemptive effect and conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt a
given state law, they will still be faced with determining to what extent a
165. For example, certain websites engage in filtering or blocking of limited offensive or unlawful content only in an effort to avoid criminal liability for themselves and their unlawful users.
This is clearly not out of a good samaritan desire, but is instead motivated purely out of a desire to
maintain the profitability of their site. Not only is this blatantly outside of the policy aims of section
230, but it is also explicitly outside of the immunity-granting provision which state “efforts taken in
good faith” are immune from civil liability. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (1996). Notice also that the very
title of this subsection is “Civil Liability,” further evidencing the conclusion that Congress was not
expecting the provision to serve as a shield for criminal activity of any kind. Curiously, courts have
not paid much attention to this clear contradiction despite the unequivocal requirement in the very
title of the immunity-granting provision—“Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening
of offensive material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996). For a discussion of potential judicial remedies for
this misconstruction, see infra Part V.A.
166. See supra Part II.A.
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defendant website should be held liable. This is necessitated by the fact
that most websites perform entirely innocuous distribution functions and
are only misappropriated by third party users bent on unlawful activity.
Thus, courts need to craft a doctrine for determining when websites are
merely hijacked by unlawful third-party users as opposed to when websites are themselves complicit in illegal activity. Inherently, any judicial
remedy will suffer from inconsistency, and given the dynamic and evolving nature of the Internet, new legislation will eventually be imperative.
A. A Judicial Band-Aid
As section 230’s immunity granting provisions continue to encroach into the traditional zone of state police power, courts will be faced
with a choice of either applying broad immunity, contradicting Congress’s intended scope, or fashioning creative construction of section 230
to avoid this conflict. However, because courts can and should construe
federal statutes and regulatory schemes to preserve historic state police
powers,167 it is only a matter of time until the current broad immunitygranting interpretations fall away, leaving a much more restricted construction.168 As previously mentioned, several courts have already begun
to construe section 230 in a narrower manner, abandoning the expansive
reading originally given to the statute in Zeran.169
Beginning with Roommates,170 an expansive reading of “develop in
part” would remove ICSPs that assume distributor-like roles to facilitate
criminal activity from section 230(c)’s grant of immunity. 171 However,
this reading of section 230 is not problem-free. In essence, the expansive
reading of the word develop, as articulated in Roomates, would serve to
remove nearly all forms of distributor liability from section 230 immuni167. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
168. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590–604 (2001) (Stevens J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
As the regulations at issue in this suit implicate [powers] that lie at the heart of the States’
traditional police power . . . our precedents require that the Court construe the preemption
provision ‘narrow[ly].’ If Congress’[s] intent to pre-empt a particular category of regulation is ambiguous, such regulations are not pre-empted. . . . [T]he scope of a pre-emption
provision must give effect to a ‘reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers,
and the law.’
Id. at 591–92 (citation omitted).
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. See supra Part II.B; see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168–70 (9th Cir. 2008).
171. See Weslander, supra note 62, at 293–96; see also Doty, supra note 65, at 129–32 (discussing how the Roommates court extrapolated the “underlying illegality” test from it’s construction
of the term “development” contained in section 230).
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ty. While this would be more in accord with the original aims of section
230 set out by Congress,172 it certainly would not be a practical solution
given the enormous burden it would place on legitimate websites and the
dampening effect it would have on free speech.173 Instead, a more nuanced approach is appropriate—one that would not subject to liability the
majority of legitimate online intermediaries that are merely misappropriated by third parties to unlawful ends.
The court in Roommates articulated an “underlying illegality” test
to operate in tandem with its expansive interpretation of section 230’s
development language. 174 This component preserves the broad grant of
immunity for the vast majority of websites, while exposing to liability
only those websites that somehow “contribute[] materially to the alleged
illegality of the conduct.”175 The problem with this test is in its application. Some courts have adopted a more discernable “solicitation standard,”
which only voids section 230 immunity if websites explicitly invite unlawful content or activity from third parties. 176 However, this approach
allows websites to flout both civil and criminal liability by avoiding express solicitations, and instead, resorting to more subtle and tacit invitations. At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have employed an
“inducement” standard whereby a website is excluded from immunity
when it engages in conduct that encourages third parties to behave unlawfully. 177 The inducement standard is preferable to the solicitation
standard in its ability to exclude immunity from websites that maintain a
mere rouse of legitimacy. However, it could become subject to overapplication absent an objective inquiry into the knowledge and intent of
the ICSP.
The most comprehensive judicial solution to properly limiting section 230’s immunity centers around an objective bad faith exception. 178
This exception would essentially begin with the inducement analysis outlined above, but it would only void immunity upon a showing that the
defendant-website was acting in bad faith. In most instances, this would
have to be objectively inferred from the website’s conduct. For example,
172. Specifically, it would remove many forms of distributor liability from the grant of immunity and restore the focus of the provision on publisher functions.
173. See Lukmire, supra note 21, at 404–05 and authorities cited therein.
174. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68; Doty, supra note 65, at 129–32.
175. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68.
176. See Doty, supra note 65, at 132–37 and cases cited therein.
177. Id. at 136–42.
178. Lukmire, supra note 21, 407–11 (“An implied bad faith exception to section 230 immunity for distributors of defamatory content would allow more plaintiffs with meritorious claims to
prevail, and would be easier to implement and administer.”).
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bad faith can be inferred from affirmative actions to enhance the content’s unlawfulness, such as creating financial incentives; reducing the
risk of detection by law-enforcement; creating webpages devoted to illegal content; and providing tools specifically designed for the illegal content. Implied incentives, such as deriving substantial financial gain from
the unlawful content, would also evidence bad faith on the part of website.
The proposed bad faith exception would seriously limit the application of section 230 immunity to websites engaged in unlawful activity
and allow states to employ more proactive measures targeting these intermediaries. However, short of a Supreme Court decision that comprehensively articulates this standard, any judicial remedy will inherently
suffer from inconsistency in application and jurisdiction among states.
Eventually, it will become necessary for Congress to amend or replace
section 230 with a more agile statutory scheme aimed at preserving freedom of information on the Internet while still allowing states to combat
criminal activity.
B. The Eventual Legislative Imperative
The most obvious solution to avoiding unconstitutional encroachments into state police powers is to enact legislation either amending section 230 or replacing it with a more sophisticated statutory scheme. Given that the majority of commentary on section 230 is from a defamatory
view, 179 the most common solutions have drawn from other statutory
schemes currently in place. Specifically, several commentators have proposed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a viable starting
point for modeling a new section 230.180 Essentially, a DMCA-modeled
statute would impose liability on a website for knowingly hosting unlawful content, deriving a benefit attributable to the offending content, and
refusing to remove the unlawful content after receiving notice of its illegality. 181 While a DMCA-modeled statute does appear applicable in a
defamation context, its requirements of notice and case-by-case removal
of individual content make it an impractical solution for allowing lawenforcement agencies to police and shut down websites devoted to hosting illegal activity. At the same time, a statute that imposes traditional
“facilitation” liability would unnecessarily exempt from immunity web179. See supra Part III.B.
180. See Colby Ferris, Communication Indecency: Why the Communications Decency Act, and
the Judicial Interpretation of It, Has Led to a Lawless Internet in the Area of Defamation, 14 BARRY
L. REV. 123, 135 (2010); see also Lukmire, supra note 21, at 406.
181. See Ferris, supra note 180, at 135.
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sites that are occasionally misused for illegal purposes. What is needed is
a statute that strikes a balance between the two approaches.
One alternative would be a statute that essentially codifies the objective bad faith principles. 182 However, the text of the statute would
have to walk the line between exempting websites that take affirmative
steps to disseminate unlawful content and those that serve merely as passive conduits of information. Basically, this would amount to a showing
of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff or State, thus maintaining the presumption of immunity. However, upon a showing that the defendant
website has taken affirmative actions or otherwise designed its services
to invite, encourage, or facilitate unlawful content and activity, the website will no longer be immune from civil or criminal liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 230 of the CDA was enacted to remove the disincentive for
online intermediaries to take good faith efforts to monitor and remove
offensive content from their websites. Specifically, Congress meant to
remove traditional forms of publisher liability and the accompanying
legal exposure in the context of defamatory and pornographic content
posted by third parties. Thus, Congress intended to preempt any state or
local laws that imposed such theories of liability. Unfortunately, early
courts interpreting section 230 over-read the scope of immunity provided
by the provision and erroneously broadened the range of civil and criminal liability schemes subject to preemption. The negative consequences
of this misreading are increasingly felt as more and more criminal activity migrates to the Internet, and the online intermediaries that knowingly
host such activity are held immune from traditional modes of checking
such lawlessness.
Turning the tide against a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet
starts with a reexamination of Congress’s intended scope of immunity
and the implicit preemptive effect of section 230. Beginning with the
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt an entire field of
traditional state police power, and after closely examining the textual
components of section 230 as well as the legislative history, it soon becomes apparent that immunity is only applicable in a specific set of circumstances. In applying this analysis, courts could incorporate some
form of objective bad faith determination to distinguish between websites that are furthering the purposes of section 230, as opposed to those
that are merely posing as good Samaritans. Alternatively, Congress could
182. See Lukmire, supra note 21, and accompanying text.
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clarify the scope of immunity provided to online intermediaries by
amending section 230 or enacting a new regulatory scheme all together.

